The Causal Relationship between Corruption and Poverty: A Panel Data Analysis by Negin, Vahideh et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Causal Relationship between
Corruption and Poverty: A Panel Data
Analysis
Vahideh Negin and Zakariah Abd Rashid and Hesam
Nikopour
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management
University Putra Malaysia (UPM)
25. June 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24871/
MPRA Paper No. 24871, posted 10. September 2010 17:32 UTC
1 
 
The Causal Relationship between Corruption and Poverty: 
A Panel Data Analysis 
 
Vahideh Negin (Corresponding author) 
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management University Putra Malaysia (UPM), 
43400 UPM Serdang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia. 
 Email: vahidehnegin@yahoo.com and gs18531@mutiara.upm.edu.my. 
 
Zakariah B Abd Rashid 
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management University Putra Malaysia (UPM),  
43400 UPM Serdang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia.  
Email: zar@econ.upm.edu.my,Tel.: + 603 8946 7702. 
 
Hesam Nikopour  
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management University Putra Malaysia (UPM), 
43400 UPM Serdang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia. 
 Email: hessamnik@yahoo.com and gs18533@mutiara.upm.edu.my. 
 
Abstract 
Most of the studies which have investigated the link between corruption and poverty may draw conclusions 
on causality in the form of models that only show correlation. This study is set out to investigate the 
Granger causal relationship between corruption and poverty. It uses dynamic panel system GMM 
estimators, focuses on capability poverty using human poverty index (HPI) and is based on a sample of 97 
developing countries during 1997-2006. The empirical findings reveal that corruption and poverty go 
together, with bidirectional causality. 
Keywords: Corruption, Poverty, Panel Data Analysis  
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is a cause of poverty and a barrier to successful poverty eradication. It could destroy the efforts 
of developing countries in order to alleviate poverty. Corruption’s relation to poverty are numerous and 
common. In the public sector, corruption delays and diverts economic growth and deepens poverty. 
Alternatively, poverty invites corruption as it weakens economic, political and social institutions. 
Corruption is one of the major determinants of poverty. Combating corruption is therefore a crucial part in 
the poverty reduction process. High levels of corruption aggravate the living conditions of the poor by 
distorting the entire decision making process connected with public sector programs. Corruption deepens 
poverty by hampering productive programs such as education and health care at the expense of larger 
capital intensive projects which can provide better opportunities to extract illegal incomes. Alternatively, 
social and income inequalities in poor countries make greater imbalances in the distribution of power and 
encourage corruption (Ndikumana, 2006).  
2 
 
Although the link between corruption and poverty is often noted (Husted, 1999, ACEG, 2000, Gupta et al., 
2002, Gyimah-Brempong, 2002, and You and Khagram, 2005) the question of whether a causal 
relationship exists between corruption and poverty based on panel data models, has received less attention. 
In other words, most of the studies which have investigated the link between corruption and poverty may 
conclude on causality in models that only show correlation. Thus, the policy recommendation for fight 
against poverty and corruption can simply be wrong. Taking it to the limit, how good is it to try to decrease 
corruption by implementing anti poverty strategies if the high poverty level is simply caused by high 
corruption and not the other way around? 
Therefore, this study is set out to investigate the Granger causal relationship between corruption and 
poverty. It uses dynamic panel system GMM estimators, focuses on capability poverty using human 
poverty index (HPI) since it portrays in a more accurate way the state of poverty, and is based on a sample 
of 97 developing countries during 1997-2006. 
2. Literature Review 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between corruption and poverty has been 
developed from the mid 1990s that some non government organizations such as transparency international 
(TI) have focused on the problems of corruption and the rights of citizens to participate in political, 
economic and social development processes and corruption indices have produced. International 
organizations such as IMF and World Bank have also played a growing role to help countries in 
overcoming corruption. 
The theoretical propositions for the relationship between corruption and income inequality also arise from 
rent theory and the ideas of Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Krueger (1974). Corruption causes some groups 
and individuals permanently benefit more, the distributional effects of corruption are more rigid as the 
corruption continues and it is a function of government sharing in resource allocation (Gupta et al., 1998).  
These theoretical propositions on the relationship between corruption and poverty are supported by 
numerous empirical studies. In a cross national analysis of the channels through which corruption adversely 
affects income distribution and poverty, Gupta et al. (1998) specified an inequality model using Gini 
coefficient to measure income inequality and several indices of corruption. In their study, they ascertained 
that increasing income inequality due to corruption reduce economic growth and thereby aggravate poverty. 
They also found that tax evasion and its exemption in favor of wealthy elites can reduce the tax base and 
leads to more income inequality as well as diverting benefits from poverty reduction measures due to poor 
targeting of social programs. 
A World Bank study (2000) on whether there “is any apparent link, within Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA), between corruption and measures of income inequality” found that lower levels of corruption are 
statistically correlated with lower levels of income inequality and the results show that the costs of 
corruption place more burden on smaller firms. 
Karstedt (2001) in her study of 35 OECD countries tested corruption against income distribution. Results 
showed that countries with high income inequality have high levels of corruption, while those with high 
levels of secondary education and a high proportion of women in government positions have experienced 
decreasing levels of corruption. The relation between corruption and income inequality was nonlinear, 
indicating that after countries attain a specific level of income equality, corruption exponentially decreases. 
Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002) propose a theoretical model to explain why the rich tend to focus on gaining 
income from corrupt activities. Individuals face a fixed cost when they are looking for gains from 
corruption through government employment but not into productive activity. Another motivation for the 
rich to enter the corrupt government bureaucracy is that they can protect their own wealth from the corrupt 
appropriative activities of other government officials. So the model contains both supply and demand side 
reasons for why corrupt government is the domain of the wealthy. The poor are productive and are the 
martyr. The model is motivated by evidence that the rich in poor countries tend to keep themselves and 
their families in government employment and in control of government. Government officials also often 
have family businesses that are related to the officials’ fields of authority.  
You and Khagram (2005) believe that income inequality also increase the level of corruption through 
material and normative mechanisms. Their analysis of 129 countries using 2SLS methods with different 
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instrumental variables supports their hypotheses using different measures of corruption. Because income 
inequality also contributes to corruption, societies often fall into vicious circles of inequality and 
corruption. 
Dincer and Gunalp (2008) analyzed the impact of corruption on income inequality and poverty in the 
United States using an objective measure of corruption, different measures of inequality and income 
poverty, time series and cross sectional data. The results show robustly that increasing corruption leads to 
increases income inequality and poverty. 
There is an agreement that inequality also contributes to high levels of corruption. While corruption may 
lower GDP, poorer countries may not effectively fight corruption due to lack of the resources (Husted, 
1999) and (Paldam, 2002). You and Khagram (2005) provide evidence for reverse causality. They argue 
that the poor are not able to monitor the rich and it enables them to misuse their position. 
3.  Model and Econometric Methodology  
The empirical model is aimed at investigating the Granger causal relationship between corruption and 
poverty using dynamic panel system GMM estimators. Thus, the empirical model that employed in the 
analysis is as follows:  
∑∑∑
=
−
=
−
=
− ++++=
r
k
itktik
n
l
ltil
m
j
jtijit uzxyy
1
,
1
,
1
, γβδα
        
(1) 
Where the causality-based variables x  and y  are corruption or poverty. I use from major control variables 
( z ) as mediators between corruption and poverty including inflation, political freedom and stability, rural 
population, and gender.      
Inflation: Different aspects of macroeconomic instability, as well as low growth rates, can place a heavy 
burden on the poor. Inflation, as one of the aspects of macroeconomic instability, is a regressive tax, which 
its burden is especially carried by those in lower income groups since the poor tend to hold most of their 
wealth in the form of cash, and also they are commonly less able than the rich to secure the real value of 
their incomes and wealth from inflation. Therefore, price increasing generally erode the real wages and 
assets of the poor more than those of the rich. Moreover, beyond certain thresholds, inflation also 
constraints output growth, an effect that will influence even those among the poor who infrequently use 
money for economic transaction (Ames et al., 2002). 
Where agents can inflate the price of goods which is needed to start an investment project, high and 
variable inflation may increase the cost of monitoring the agent. So it causes higher corruption and lower 
investment (Braun and Di Tella, 2000). 
Political Freedom and Stability: Kaufmann et al. (1999) define governance as, “The traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.”  
Lack of transparency in rules, laws, and processes makes a breeding ground for corruption. Rules are often 
not clear and only trained lawyers can understand them. Their specifying documents are also not available 
for all people (Tanzi, 1998). In many countries, there are many regulations and authorizations which give 
monopoly power to authorizing officials. Therefore, who need the authorizations or permits may have to 
pay bribes to these officials who must authorize or inspect their activities. 
On the other hand, political freedom and stability reduces poverty in different dimensions including 
empowerment, capabilities, opportunities, and security. The poor can influence policy making, budget 
priorities, and program designing through participating in political and administrative processes. It 
increases the poor access to markets of lands, credit and labor leading them to enter in more profitable 
activities, which is important for reducing vulnerability to agricultural shocks. Thus, governments need to 
reform the regulations to improve market access, and distribute information to the poor about opportunities 
for employment, asset ownership, and local and international prices as the measures of poverty reduction. 
By improving voice and accountability and limiting exploitation by police, governments can also reduce 
vulnerability to crime, violence, and corruption of the poor (Girishankar et al., 2002). 
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Gender: Women’s participation in public sector reduces corruption in business and government. Several 
studies show that in countries whit high gender equality, the level of corruption is lower (Dollar and Gatti, 
1999, Swamy et al., 1999). This is true even when countries with the same civil liberties, education, legal 
institutions, and GDP are compared. Then, in order to lower the level of corruption, it may be better to 
design policies to improve the role of women in public life. Gender disparities are not only inequitable but 
also have economic consequences such as slowing down growth and increasing poverty. Evidences show 
that growth and social development significantly affects poverty outcomes. It means that for ultra-poor 
households, women have crucial role to prevent increasing their poverty. Strategies to improve women's 
economic participation can increase their potential for reducing household poverty (Subbarao and 
Ezemenari, 1995). 
Rural Population: In spite of large rural populations, they often lack communication infrastructure which 
makes it difficult to form interest integrations to shape or even follow national policy debates. The diversity 
of rural societies also creates shocking obstacles to participation. In some regions, there are different ethnic, 
linguistic, religious or cultural groups, which in turn build large diversity in social, economic and political 
power. Understanding these power differences and the forms of exclusion leaving some groups with much 
less voice and security than others, is necessary to establish participation mechanisms to ensure the 
inclusion of excluded groups. Promoting the rural infrastructure can be a tool for improving local 
governance and reducing corruption through the establishment of transparent and accountable practices for 
priority setting, decision making, implementation, operations and maintenance. 
Furthermore, in most developing countries the likelihood of being poor and the severity of poverty are 
more in rural areas due to five characteristics of rural space; a strong dependency on the natural resources 
to confirm livelihoods leading to high risk environment, a low population density and geographic 
constraints leading to high transaction costs and limited access to physical and social infrastructure, an 
illegal economy, which makes it more difficult for policy makers to provide targeted poverty reduction 
measures, cultural and linguistic differences leading to limited voice and participation in national and even 
local decision making processes, not recognizing the important role of women in income generating 
programs (Cord, 2002). In spite of the importance of rural sector for economic growth strategies and 
poverty elimination, rural stakeholders' interests are often weakly represented in national policymaking 
processes, including in many Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSPs). Nearly 75 percent of the world’s 
poor are located in rural areas and by this trend, the global percentage of rural poor will not fall below 50 
percent before 2035 (Ravallion, 2000, and Alderman 2001). 
In equation (1); Tt ,...,1=  is time and Ni ,...1= is cross section and m , n  and r are the number of lags. It 
is assumed that the itu  follow a one-way error component model: 
ittiit vu ++= λµ                                                                 (2) 
Where ( )2,0~ µσµ IIDi  is the unobserved country-specific effect, ( )2,0~ λσλ IIDt  represents period-
specific effects and ( )2,0~ vit IIDv σ  the error term.  The dynamic panel data regressions described in (1) 
and (2) are characterized by two sources of persistence over time, autocorrelation due to the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors and individual effects characterizing the heterogeneity 
among the individuals. Since ity  is a function of iµ , it follows that 1, −tiy  is also a function of iµ . 
Therefore, 1, −tiy , a right-hand regressor in (1) is correlated with the error term. This renders the OLS 
estimator biased and inconsistent even if the itv  are not serially correlated. 
In panel estimation, neither the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator nor the Fixed Effect (FE) 
estimator will produce consistent estimates in the presence of dynamics and endogenous regressors (Baltagi 
1995). Arellano and Bond (1991) have proposed a dynamic panel General Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator which is an instrument variable (IV) estimator that uses all past values of endogenous regressors 
as well as current values of strictly exogenous regressors as instruments. Estimates can be based on first 
difference, or on orthogonal deviations.  
Arellano- Bond estimation starts by transforming all regressors, usually by differencing, and uses the 
Generalized Method of Moments, and so is called Difference GMM. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
estimator augments Arellano-Bond by making an additional assumption, that first differences of instrument 
variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This allows the introduction of more instruments, and can 
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dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a system of two equations-the original equation as well as the 
transformed one- and is known as System GMM. It is preferred to difference GMM since finite sample bias 
problem caused by weak instruments in first differenced GMM will be addressed by using system GMM. It 
also offers forward orthogonal deviations, an alternative to differencing that preserves sample size in panels 
with gaps. And it allows finer control over the instrument matrix.   
Both Difference GMM and System GMM are general estimators designed for situations with 1) “small T, 
large N" panels, meaning few time periods and many individuals; 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) a 
single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) independent 
variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated with past and possibly current realizations of 
the error; 5) fixed individual effects; and 6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but 
not across them. Arellano and Bond proposed two estimators -one- and two-step estimators- with the two-
step estimator being the optimal estimator. The Sargan test of over- identifying restrictions is performed 
which is a joint test of model specification and appropriateness of the instrument.   
The test of whether x  Granger-causes y  consists of a test of the hypothesis that nβββ === ...21  are 
equal to zero (Wald test) after controlling for ,y s own lags and the influence of additional controls ( z ). 
4.  Data 
Until few years ago, few economists considered corruption as a researchable phenomenon. It was not 
researchable due to lack of quantitative data. Although the early efforts of the Rose-Ackerman (1978) lead 
to designing interesting models, quantitative data were missing until the mid 1990s that CPI was published. 
The publication of this data has made corruption and poor governance to be a public challenge. 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): The annual CPI is the best known TI index of corruption. It ranks 180 
countries from one to ten (with 10 being low) by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by 
expert assessments and opinion surveys. 
Although critics believe that CPI still has important weaknesses, it has received wide publicity and fulfils 
Transparency International's aim of raising public and political awareness of corruption. But as the CPI is 
based on the perception, its results should be interpreted with caution.  
Human Poverty Index (HPI): The HPI-1 is the human poverty index for developing countries. It is 
discarded income in the variable mix and included only “the most basic dimensions of deprivation: a short 
life, lack of basic education, and lack of access to public and private resources” (Doraid, 1997). The 
formula used to calculate the HPI-1 is:  
HPI-1 ( )[ ] αααα /13213/1 PPP ++=  
where: 
1P = Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40(times 100) 
2P = Adult illiteracy rate 
3P = 1/2(population not using an improved water source) + 1/2(children under weight for age) 
3=α  
Political Freedom and Stability: The institutional quality data sets are assembled dataset by Kaufmann et 
al. (2008). These indicators are based on information collected through numerous cross-country surveys 
and polls of experts. Kaufmann et al. (2008) use a model to coverage approximately 212 countries for each 
of their indicators. They introduces six different indicators that each of them represents a different 
dimension of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Political Stability and Lack of Violence, (iii) 
Government Effectiveness, (iv)Regulatory Quality, (v) Rule of Law, and (vi) Control of Corruption. 
Because of collinearity between these indicators, the average of voice and accountability, and political 
stability is defined as the political freedom and stability and average of government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality and rule of law as the government efficiency. 
5. Empirical Results 
The Granger causality between corruption and poverty is explored using two step system GMM method 
with t-values and test statistics that are asymptotically robust to general heteroscedasticity and corrected for 
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a small sample bias. To investigate Granger-causality relationship between corruption and poverty, two 
cases are considered: (i) corruption does not Granger-cause poverty, and (ii) poverty does not Granger-
cause corruption. 
5.1. Effects of Corruption on Poverty, Two Step System GMM Estimation 
The empirical results of the poverty equations are presented in Table 1 which its columns present different 
specifications of the poverty equation. In all models the variable of interest is corruption.  
In specification 1, there is no control variable while in specification 2; rural population (% of total 
population) is used as a control variable. In specification 3, gender (female labor force participation rate) 
variable is added to rural population as another control variable and in specification 4, inflation is added to 
rural population and gender as the other control variable and finally in specification 5 the indicator of 
political freedom and stability is added to rural population, gender, and inflation as a control variable.  
In all specifications, year dummies and levels equation are used as instrument variables because all other 
regressors are not strictly exogenous. The poverty equation fits the data well as indicated by the regression 
statistics. In all specifications, the lags length of corruption is four and the lags length of dependent variable 
(poverty) is two. In general, the optimal lag is selected until no serial correlation in residual is obtained 
(Arellano, 2003). Therefore, to select the optimal lag, the AR(1) and AR(2) statistics are employed. The 
results in all specifications suggest that there is a significant relationship between corruption and poverty.  
The rural population in specifications 2-5 has a positive effect on the poverty as expected and is statistically 
significant at 1% level. This positive effect is consistent with Ravallion (2000), Alderman (2001), and Cord 
(2002) who argue that in developing countries the likelihood of being poor and the severity of poverty are 
more in rural areas. In specifications 3-5, the coefficient of gender is negative and significant at 1% level 
indicating that women have crucial role to prevent increasing household poverty. The result is consistent 
with Subbarao and Ezemenari (1995). The lagged inflation has a statistically significant positive effect (1% 
level) on the poverty in specifications 4 and 5 which is consistent with Ames et al. (2002), and finally in 
specification 5, the political freedom and stability as a governance indicator, has a statistically significant 
negative effect on poverty at 1% level. The expected negative coefficient of political freedom and stability 
is consistent with the findings of Girishankar et al. (2002). 
The Granger-causality effect can be captured through the significance tests of the coefficients of the lagged 
corruption variable equal to zero. If the null hypothesis of no causality is rejected, then one may conclude 
that corruption Granger-caused poverty. For this, the Granger causality test (Wald test) is used for all 
specifications. The result indicates that corruption causes poverty at 1% level. That is, past information on 
corruption help improve prediction of poverty.  
5.2. Effects of Poverty on Corruption, Two Step System GMM Estimation 
The estimates of corruption equations are presented in Table 2 which its columns present different 
specifications of the corruption equation. In all models the variable of interest is poverty. 
There is no control variable in specification 1 while in specification 2; rural population (% of total 
population) is used as a control variable. In specification 3, gender (female labor force participation rate) 
variable is added to rural population as another control variable and in specification 4, inflation is added to 
rural population and gender as the other control variable and finally in specification 5 the indicator of 
political freedom and stability is added to rural population, gender, and inflation as a control variable.  
In all specifications, year dummies and levels equation are used as instrument variables because all other 
regressors are not strictly exogenous. The corruption equation fits the data well as indicated by the 
regression statistics. According to the AR(1) and AR(2) statistics, in all specifications, the lags length of 
poverty is three and the lags length of dependent variable (corruption) is also three. The results of all 
specifications suggest that there is a significant relationship between poverty and corruption.  
The coefficient of lagged rural population in specifications 2-5 is negative as expected and significantly 
different from zero at 1% level indicating that increased rural population is associated with increased 
corruption (reduction in CPI). This positive effect is consistent with Cord (2002). In specifications 3-5, the 
coefficient of lagged gender is positive but insignificant. In other words, increasing women role in public 
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life is associated with decreasing corruption (increasing CPI). This negative effect is consistent with Dollar 
and Gatti (1999), and Swamy et al. (1999). 
In specifications 4 and 5, the coefficient of inflation is negative and significantly different from zero at 1% 
level indicating that increased inflation increases corruption (decreases CPI). This result is consistent with 
Braun and Di Tella (2000), and finally in specification 5, the coefficient of political freedom and stability is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The expected positive coefficient of political freedom and 
stability indicates that increasing political freedom and stability as a governance indicator decreases 
corruption (increases CPI). This result is consistent with Tanzi (1998). 
The Granger-causality effect can be captured through the significance tests of the coefficients of the lagged 
corruption variable equal to zero. If the null hypothesis of no causality is rejected, then one may conclude 
that poverty Granger-caused corruption. For this, the Granger causality test (Wald test) is used for all 
specifications. The result indicates that at 1% level, poverty causes corruption. That is, past information on 
poverty help improve prediction of corruption.  
5.3. Diagnostic Test 
Three types of diagnostic test are used for validity of the empirical models. First, the Sargan test of 
identifying restrictions under the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments (Arellano and Bond, 
1991).  The results of the Sargan test in system GMM estimator are reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Based 
on the Sargan test statistic for all models, the high p-value indicates that the null hypothesis of no over-
identifying restrictions fail to reject. Therefore, the Sargan test statistics indicate that all specifications are 
well specified and that the instrument vector is appropriate.  
The second test is proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which examines the hypothesis that the residual 
from the estimated regressions is first-order correlated but not second-order correlated. The second test 
examines the statistics (AR(1) and AR(2)) for presence of serial correlation in the first differenced residuals 
of first and second order, reported as the asymptotically standard normal distribution values. The results of 
the test for first-order autocorrelation AR(1) indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected; the p-values of the 
Arellano and Bond statistics in Tables 4.1  and 4.2 are significant at the 1% level.  
The test results for second-order autocorrelation AR(2) fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and the statistics reported are p-values, giving the probability of correctly rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The absence of serial correlation shows the differenced residuals by 
significant negative first-order serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation. Therefore, the 
Arellano-Bond test statistics show that the instruments used are independent of the error term (no 
autocorrelation) and hence appropriate for the estimation; overall, the first and the second order serial 
correlation tests are all satisfied. The third test statistics also reject the null hypothesis that the time 
dummies are jointly equal to zero at the 1% level. 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper studies the causal relationship between corruption and poverty. In order to achieve this 
objective, data of 97 developing countries during 1997-2006 and causality methods GMM estimators 
developed for dynamic panel data is used. By focusing on capability poverty using the HPI, the empirical 
findings suggest that corruption and poverty go together, with causality running in both directions. Hence, 
it is necessary to address the integrated strategy to reduce poverty and fight corruption. In other words, the 
attempts to reduce poverty must be complemented by serious efforts to reduce corruption.  
Combating corruption under the heading "strengthening good governance" plays a key role in poverty 
reduction (TI, 2008). Fighting against poverty and corruption includes improving citizen engagement and a 
state’s accountability. Since marginalization and political, economic and social exclusion are highest for the 
poor, they are most frequently forced to resort to corrupt practices. This makes a big challenge for the 
development community. If anticorruption programs are not linked to alternative basic needs interventions, 
they will have a negative impact on the people who need help. To have effective pro-poor anti-corruption 
strategies, the inclusion of social, political and cultural capital into the analysis of poverty is necessary. 
These strategies must look more closely at factors that limit opportunities for poor citizens' access to 
political and economic decision making.  
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This study suggests that there are at least three categories of pro-poor anti-corruption interventions in 
developing countries. These are promoting inclusiveness, promoting lawfulness, and promoting 
accountability. 
Promoting Inclusiveness: Social exclusion that limits citizens’ participation in political, economic and 
social processes is contrary to pro-poor anticorruption efforts. Disenfranchising of citizens from society is 
inconsistent with the concept of good governance and theoretically has no place in democratic societies. It 
can be redressed by empowering groups which have been historically marginalized. Hence, inclusiveness is 
related closely to issues of empowerment and decentralization. 
Promoting Lawfulness: Lawfulness is closely related to issues of justice, criminality, conflict resolution, 
social violence, peace and security, and human rights. Anderson (1999) figures a number of mechanisms 
through which lawlessness and poverty correlated to each other. 
Violence by police, prison officers and other public officials has great effect on the poor, the abuses of 
human rights, official harassment, and police may disproportionately affect the poor. The poor are more 
vulnerable to arbitrary treatment, intimidation and humiliation by public officials, and they are at greater 
risk of losing their property to public or private theft.  
Promoting Accountability: Accountability means that government remains responsive for its actions and 
could be sanctioned. A significant step to develop a pro-poor anti-corruption strategy is linking the rights of 
marginalized communities and individuals to more accountable governments. By promoting political 
accountability, the poor are seen not as victims but rather as stakeholders in combating corruption (Eberlei, 
2007). 
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Table 1: The Estimated Results from the Two Step Dynamic Panel GMM-SYS (Effects of Corruption on 
Poverty) 
Dependent variable: 
( )tHPIlog  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
( ) 1log −tHPI  0.985 (51.61)*** 
0.927 
(42.83)*** 
0.963 
(32.60)*** 
0.936 
(27.78)*** 
0.986 
(24.34)*** 
( ) 2log −tHPI  0.005 (0.21) 
-0.086 
(-4.39)*** 
-0.118 
(-4.44)*** 
-0.090 
(-3.67)*** 
-0.119 
(-5.37)*** 
( ) 1log −tCPI  0.047 (1.53) 
0.015 
(0.52) 
0.010 
(0.37) 
-0.024 
(-0.76) 
0.013 
(0.45) 
( ) 2log −tCPI  0.043 (1.89)* 
0.045 
(1.38) 
0.032 
(1.22) 
0.021 
(0.85) 
0.021 
(0.78) 
( ) 3log −tCPI  0.273 (15.81)*** 
0.248 
(9.45)*** 
0.267 
(10.87)*** 
0.262 
(10.18)*** 
0.256 
(6.66)*** 
( ) 4log −tCPI  -0.106 (-3.51)*** 
-0.071 
(-2.50)** 
-0.068 
(-2.29)** 
-0.077 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.051 
(-1.07) 
tRural)log(   0.281 (6.69)*** 
0.241 
(7.17)*** 
0.246 
(5.26)*** 
0.203 
(2.92)*** 
( )tGenderlog    -0.190 (-2.79)*** 
-0.141 
(-3.00)*** 
-0.256 
(-5.75)*** 
( ) 2log −tInflation     0.017 (6.12)*** 
0.013 
(5.36)*** 
( )treedompoliticalflog      -0.099 (-4.60)*** 
2001dummy  0.048 
(11.60)*** 
0.075 
(13.30)*** 
0.071 
(10.87)*** 
0.068 
(8.23)*** 
0.071 
(8.68)*** 
2002dummy   
     
2003dummy   
     
2004dummy  0.022 
(11.17)*** 
0.015 
(2.87)*** 
0.017 
(3.08)*** 
0.018 
(3.03)*** 
0.016 
(2.42)** 
2005dummy       
cons−  -0.322 
(-4.00)*** 
-0.895 
(-5.06)*** 
-0.027 
(-0.09) 
-0.198 
(-0.82) 
0.634 
(2.06)** 
Number of observation 236 232 232 221 221 
Number of groups 52 51 51 51 51 
AR(1), (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
AR(2), (p value) 0.133 0.129 0.131 0.242 0.193 
Sargan test,  (p value) 0.221 0.291 0.324 0.338 0.338 
Wald test 
( )0)log(:0 =−itCPIH  (278.2)*** (119.3)*** (120.2)*** (170.2)*** (87.2)*** 
Wald test 
( )0:0 =tdummyH  (360.8)*** (181.6)*** (140.9)*** (102.3)*** (88.5)*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtdpdsys command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, 
** Significant at the 5 percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 2: The Estimated Results from the Two Step Dynamic Panel GMM-SYS (Effects of Poverty on 
Corruption) 
Dependent variable: 
( )tCPIlog  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
( ) 1log −tCPI  0.734 (22.96)*** 
0.661 
(18.49)*** 
0.648 
(16.68)*** 
0.556 
(12.75)*** 
0.498 
(11.72)*** 
( ) 2log −tCPI  0.061 (2.76)** 
0.077 
(3.38)*** 
0.088 
(4.19)*** 
0.083 
(4.07)*** 
0.083 
(4.76)*** 
( ) 3log −tCPI  -0.007 (-0.53) 
-0.009 
(-0.70) 
-0.006 
(-0.52) 
0.003 
(0.35) 
0.001 
(0.09)*** 
( ) 1log −tHPI  -0.184 (-7.30)*** 
-0.109 
(-4.02)*** 
-0.103 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.081 
(-2.56)** 
-0.102 
(-3.64)*** 
( ) 2log −tHPI  0.159 (4.36)*** 
0.185 
(5.45)*** 
0.175 
(5.33)*** 
0.128 
(4.45)*** 
0.138 
(4.67)*** 
( ) 3log −tHPI  -0.074 (-3.04)*** 
-0.032 
(-1.46) 
-0.018 
(-0.82) 
0.006 
(0.27) 
-0.004 
(-0.18) 
1)log( −tRural   -0.295 (-5.02)*** 
-0.346 
(-5.49)*** 
-0.427 
(-7.52)*** 
-0.329 
(-4.77)*** 
( ) 1log −tGender    0.069 (1.45) 
0.076 
(1.21) 
0.013 
(0.24) 
( )tInflationlog     -0.008 (-4.22)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.91)*** 
( )treedompoliticalflog      0.069 (3.61)*** 
2000dummy  0.015 
(1.90)* 
0.013 
(1.63) 
0.015 
(1.98)** 
0.024 
(2.84)*** 
0.019 
(2.44)** 
2001dummy       
2002dummy  0.043 
(7.48)*** 
0.040 
(6.37)*** 
0.038 
(6.35)*** 
0.033 
(5.34)*** 
0.033 
(5.60)*** 
2003dummy       
2004dummy  0.042 
(7.55)*** 
0.028 
(4.84)*** 
0.028 
(5.24)*** 
0.028 
(5.18)*** 
0.032 
(5.08)*** 
2005dummy  0.038 
(6.71)*** 
0.031 
(7.48)*** 
0.029 
(8.01)*** 
0.033 
(6.56)*** 
0.038 
(6.26)*** 
2006dummy  0.039 
(5.78)*** 
0.027 
(5.01)*** 
0.025 
(4.09)*** 
0.029 
(5.03)*** 
0.036 
(5.96)*** 
cons−  0.498 
(6.37)*** 
1.269 
(6.71)*** 
1.162 
(5.40)*** 
1.557 
(4.87)*** 
1.315 
(4.53)*** 
Number of observation 300 297 297 286 286 
Number of groups 68 67 67 64 64 
AR(1), (p value) 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.008 
AR(2), (p value) 0.846 0.567 0.505 0.641 0.631 
Sargan test,  (p value) 0.215 0.286 0.282 0.329 0.269 
Wald test 
( )0)log(:0 =−itHPIH  (93.7)*** (38.5)*** (39.8)*** (24.2)*** (26.6)*** 
Wald test 
( )0:0 =tdummyH  (239.3)*** (193.3)*** (196.5)*** (157.1)*** (146.1)*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtdpdsys command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, 
** Significant at the 5 percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
12 
 
Table 3: Countries included in the Analysis 
Algeria Indonesia Sudan 
Bangladesh Iran, Islamic Rep. Swaziland 
Barbados Jamaica Syrian Arab Republic 
Benin Jordan Tanzania 
Bhutan Kenya Thailand 
Bolivia Lao PDR Togo 
Botswana Lebanon Trinidad and Tobago 
Brazil Lesotho Tunisia 
Burkina Faso Libya Turkey 
Burundi Madagascar Uganda 
Cambodia Malawi United Arab Emirates 
Cameroon Malaysia Uruguay 
Cape Verde Maldives Venezuela, RB 
Central African Republic Mali Vietnam 
Chad Mauritania Yemen, Rep. 
Chile Mauritius Zambia 
China Mexico Zimbabwe 
Colombia Mongolia  
Comoros Morocco  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mozambique  
Congo, Rep. Myanmar  
Costa Rica Namibia  
Cote d'Ivoire Nepal  
Cuba Nicaragua  
Djibouti Niger  
Dominican Republic Nigeria  
Ecuador Oman  
Egypt, Arab Rep. Pakistan  
El Salvador Panama  
Eritrea Papua New Guinea  
Ethiopia Paraguay  
Fiji Peru  
Gambia, The Philippines  
Guatemala Rwanda  
Guinea Saudi Arabia  
Guinea-Bissau Senegal  
Guyana Sierra Leone  
Haiti Singapore  
Honduras South Africa  
India Sri Lanka  
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Table 4: Sources and Characteristics of Sample Data 
Variables Unit of Measurement Abbreviation Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
Data 
Source 
Corruption 
Perception Index 0-10 CPI  3.387 1.453 0.4 9.4 583 TI 
Inflation % Inflation  12.175 49.766 -9.89 1096.6 868 WDI 
Rural Population % of total population Rural  54.951 22.598 0 92.18 970 WDI 
Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate % Gender  54.325 17.245 16.2 93.2 970 WDI 
Political Freedom 
and Stability 
Standard 
deviation freedom
political
 35.288 19.206 0.961 89.423 970 
Kaufmann 
et al. 
(2008) 
Human Poverty 
Index  % HPI  27.948 15.531 2.5 65.5 920 
HDR, 
UNDP 
